On June 27, 2001, the FAA issued Emergency AD 2001-13-51 for BHTC Model 206L-4, 407, and 427 helicopters, which requires the following if driveshaft, part number 206-340-300-105, has ever been installed on a BHTC Model 407 helicopter:
At specified hours time-in-service (TIS), visually inspect each driveshaft for a crack, a loose bolt or nut, or red powder residue.
Before further flight, replace the driveshaft with an airworthy driveshaft if a crack, a loose bolt or nut, or red powder residue is found. Within 10 days, notify the Manager, Regulations Group, FAA, of the helicopter serial number, driveshaft serial number, and driveshaft hours TIS.
After the effective date of this AD, interchanging a driveshaft between different helicopter models is prohibited if that driveshaft has ever been installed on a BHTC Model 407 helicopter.
That action was prompted by a driveshaft failure on a BHTC Model 407 helicopter that resulted in an engine shutdownand an emergency landing. Failure of the driveshaft was due to cracking of the flexframe on the forward end of the driveshaft. The BHTC Model 206L-4 and 427 helicopters use the same part-numbered driveshaft. In addition, three other incidents of a cracked flexframe on the forward end of the driveshaft on other Model 407 helicopters have been reported. This condition, if not detected, could result in failure of a driveshaft, loss of drive to the main rotor system, and a subsequent emergency forced landing.
Transport Canada, which is the airworthiness authority for Canada, notified the FAA that an unsafe condition may exist on BHTC Model 407 helicopters. Transport Canada advises that during flight the driveshaft, P/N 206-340-300-105, failed causing engine shutdown and a forced landing. Three other incidents of the cracked flexframe on the forward end of the BHTC Model 407 driveshafts were also reported. Pending further corrective action, Transport Canada determined that a one-time visual inspection for any obvious discrepancy of the driveshaft is warranted.
The FAA has reviewed BHTC Alert Service Bulletin No. 407-01-43, dated June 8, 2001 (ASB), which describes procedures for a one-time inspection of the engine-to-transmission driveshaft, P/N 206-340-300-105. Transport Canada classified this ASB as mandatory and issued AD CF-2001-24, dated June 11, 2001, to ensure the continued airworthiness of BHTC Model 407 helicopters in Canada.
Since the unsafe condition described is likely to exist or develop on other BHTC Model 206L-4, 407, and 427 helicopters of the same type designs, the FAA issued Emergency AD 2001-13-51 to prevent failure of a driveshaft, loss of drive to the main rotor system, and a subsequent emergency forced landing. The AD requires the actions specified above. The inspections must be accomplished in accordance with the ASB described previously. The short compliance time involved is required because the previously described critical unsafecondition can adversely affect the structural integrity and controllability of the helicopter. Therefore, visually inspecting the driveshaft at the specified time intervals and replacing the driveshaft, if necessary, is required before further flight, and this AD must be issued immediately.
Since it was found that immediate corrective action was required, notice and opportunity for prior public comment thereon were impracticable and contrary to the public interest, and good cause existed to make the AD effective immediately by individual letters issued on June 27, 2001 to all known U.S. owners and operators of BHTC Model 206L-4, 407, and 427 helicopters. These conditions still exist, and the AD is hereby published in the Federal Register as an amendment to 14 CFR 39.13 to make it effective to all persons. However, a few editorial changes have been made to the AD. The zip code listed for the manufacturer has been corrected and an e-mail address for obtaining service information hasbeen added. Also, due to confusion expressed by an operator, paragraph (a)(1)(i) has been changed to clarify that the notification requirement is necessary only if a crack, a loose bolt or nut, or red powder residue is found during the visual inspection. The FAA has determined that these changes will neither increase the economic burden on an operator nor increase the scope of the AD.
The FAA estimates that 488 helicopters of U.S. registry will be affected by this AD, that it will take approximately 4 work hours per helicopter to visually inspect the driveshaft. The average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the total cost impact of the AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $117,120, assuming that each driveshaft is inspected once.
Comments Invited
Although this action is in the form of a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety and, thus, was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for public comment, comments are invited onthis rule. Interested persons are invited to comment on this rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications should identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified under the caption ADDRESSES. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments will be considered, and this rule may be amended in light of the comments received. Factual information that supports the commenter's ideas and suggestions is extremely helpful in evaluating the effectiveness of the AD action and determining whether additional rulemaking action would be needed.
Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the rule that might suggest a need to modify the rule. All comments submitted will be available in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report that summarizes each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of thisAD will be filed in the Rules Docket.
Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their mailed comments submitted in response to this rule must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket No. 2001-SW-29-AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.
The regulations adopted herein will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is determined that this final rule does not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.
The FAA has determined that this regulation is an emergency regulation that must be issued immediately to correct an unsafe condition in aircraft, and that it is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866. It has been determined further that this actioninvolves an emergency regulation under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979). If it is determined that this emergency regulation otherwise would be significant under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures, a final regulatory evaluation will be prepared and placed in the Rules Docket. A copy of it, if filed, may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption ADDRESSES.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. Section 39.13 isamended by adding a new airworthiness directive to read as follows: