Comments Invited The FAA invites you to send any written data, views, or arguments about this final rule. Send your comments using a method listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include "Docket No. FAA-2026-7211; Project Identifier MCAI-2026-00665-T" at the beginning of your comments. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the final rule, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. The FAA will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this final rule because of those comments. Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in the following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR 11.35, the FAA will post all comments received, without change, to regulations.gov , including any personal information you provide. The agency will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact received about this final rule. Confidential Business Information CBI is commercial or financial information that is both customarily and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public disclosure. If your comments responsive to this AD contain commercial or financial information that is customarily treated as private, that you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to this AD, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing CBI as "PROPIN." The FAA will treat such marked submissions as confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public docket of this AD. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to Michael Bumbaugh, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; phone: 206-231-3522; email: Michael.Bumbaugh@faa.gov. Any commentary that the FAA receives that is not specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the public docket for this rulemaking. Background The FAA issued Emergency AD 2026-13-52, dated June 29, 2026 (the emergency AD), to address an unsafe condition on all Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes. The FAA sent the emergency AD to all known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes. The emergency AD prohibits dispatching an airplane under certain dispatch provisions corresponding to MMEL items for the wing anti-ice system, wing anti ice pressure sensor; FAV, bleed air systems, engine bleed PRSOV, HPV, and pack bleed air leak and overheat detection loop; and prohibits dispatching an airplane if certain CAS messages and associated info messages are displayed. The emergency AD was prompted by Transport Canada Emergency AD CF-2026-33R1, dated June 24, 2026 (Transport Canada Emergency AD CF-2026-33R1) (also referred to as the MCAI), issued by Transport Canada, which is the aviation authority for Canada, to correct an unsafe condition on all Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (ACLP) Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes. The MCAI states it was reported to ACLP that several missing or broken HPV butterfly clips were found in a repair shop. An ACLP assessment has determined that failure of the butterfly clip may not be readily detected during operation and could remain latent until the next scheduled inspection or until secondary effects occur ( e.g., bleed leak or overheat indications). Failure of the butterfly clip may also lead to degradation of the valve sealing function. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in the inability to properly isolate the bleed system when required, uncontrolled hot air leakage, overheating of critical airplane structures and components, and degradation of structural integrity. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket at regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA-2026-7211. Related Material Transport Canada Emergency AD CF-2026-33R1 specifies a prohibition to dispatch an airplane under the provisions of the minimum equipment list (MEL) items corresponding to certain MMEL items and certain CAS messages and associated info messages. FAA's Determination These products have been approved by the civil aviation authority of another country and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to the FAA's bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, that authority has notified the FAA of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI described above. The FAA is issuing this AD after determining that the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design. AD Requirements This AD prohibits dispatching an airplane under the dispatch provisions of the operator's MEL items corresponding to certain dispatch provisions of MMEL items 30-11-00, Wing Anti-Ice System; 30-12-01, Wing Anti Ice Pressure Sensor; 36-11-92, Fan Air Valve (FAV); 36-12-00, Bleed Air Systems; 36-12-01, Engine Bleed Pressure Regulating Shutoff Valve (PRSOV); 36-12-05, HPV; and 36-21-03, Pack Bleed Air Leak and Overheat Detection Loop. This AD also prohibits dispatching an airplane if certain CAS messages and associated info messages are displayed. Interim Action The FAA considers that this AD is an interim action. If final action is later identified, the FAA might consider further rulemaking then. Justification for Immediate Adoption and Determination of the Effective Date Section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. ) authorizes agencies to dispense with notice and comment procedures for rules when the agency, for "good cause," finds that those procedures are "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." Under this section, an agency, upon finding good cause, may issue a final rule without providing notice and seeking comment prior to issuance. Further, section 553(d) of the APA authorizes agencies to make rules effective in less than thirty days, upon a finding of good cause. An unsafe condition exists that required the immediate adoption of Emergency AD 2026-13-52 issued on June 29, 2026, to all known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes. The FAA found that the risk to the flying public justified forgoing notice and comment prior to adoption of this rule because failure of the HPV butterfly clip may lead to degradation of the valve sealing function and consequent inability to properly isolate the bleed system when required, uncontrolled hot air leakage, overheating of critical airplane structures and components, and degradation of structural integrity. This could lead to loss of control of the airplane. These conditions still exist, therefore, notice and opportunity for prior public comment are impracticable and contrary to the public interest pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b). In addition, the FAA finds that good cause exists pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(d) for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days, for the same reasons the FAA found good cause to forgo notice and comment. Regulatory Flexibility Act The requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) do not apply when an agency finds good cause pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553 to adopt a rule without prior notice and comment. Because the FAA has determined that it has good cause to adopt this rule without notice and comment, RFA analysis is not required. Costs of Compliance The FAA estimates that this AD affects 211 airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA has received no definitive data on which to base the cost estimate for prohibiting dispatch of an airplane under the specified provisions and conditions. This cost may vary significantly among operators. Authority for This Rulemaking Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority. The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. Regulatory Findings This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD: (1) Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866, and (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety. The Amendment Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows: PART 39-AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. § 39.13 [Amended] 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive: 2026-13-52 Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type Certificate Previously Held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership (CSALP); Bombardier, Inc.): Amendment 39-23403; Docket No. FAA-2026-7211; Project Identifier MCAI-2026-00665-T. (a) Effective Date The FAA issued Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2026-13-52 on June 29, 2026 (also referred to as the emergency AD), directly to affected owners and operators. As a result of such actual notice, the emergency AD was effective for those owners and operators on the date it was received. This AD contains the same requirements as the emergency AD and, for those who did not receive actual notice, is effective on July 7, 2026. (b) Affected ADs None. (c) Applicability This AD applies to all Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type Certificate previously held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership (CSALP); Bombardier, Inc.) Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes, certificated in any category. (d) Subject Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 36, Pneumatic. (e) Unsafe Condition This AD was prompted by a report of several missing or broken high pressure valve (HPV) butterfly clips found in a repair shop. The FAA is issuing this AD to address failure of an HPV butterfly clip, which may remain latent and lead to secondary effects ( e.g., bleed leak or overheat conditions) and degradation of the valve sealing function. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could result in the inability to properly isolate the bleed system when required, uncontrolled hot air leakage, overheating of critical airplane structures and components, and degradation of structural integrity. (f) Compliance Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done. (g) Dispatch Prohibitions (1) As of the effective date of this AD, no person may dispatch an airplane under the operational procedures of the operator's minimum equipment list items corresponding to the operational procedures of the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) items listed in tables 1 and 2 to paragraph (g)(1) of this AD. ER07JY26.000 ER07JY26.001 ER07JY26.002 ER07JY26.003 ER07JY26.004 ER07JY26.005 ER07JY26.006 ER07JY26.007 ER07JY26.008 ER07JY26.009 ER07JY26.010 ER07JY26.011 (2) As of the effective date of this AD, no person may dispatch an airplane if any crew alerting system (CAS) message and associated info message identified in paragraph (g)(2)(i) through (xviii) of this AD is displayed. (i) L WING A/ICE LO HEAT (Caution): 30 L WING A/ICE LO HEAT-CTRL TEMP INOP (Info). (ii) L WING A/ICE LO HEAT (Caution): 30 L WING A/ICE LO HEAT-L HPV FAIL CLSD (Info). (iii) L WING A/ICE LO HEAT (Caution): 30 L WING A/ICE LO HEAT-L WING A/ICE TEMP SNSR INOP (Info). (iv) L WING A/ICE OVHT (Caution): 30 L WING A/ICE OVHT-L WING A/ICE TEMP SNSR INOP (Info). (v) R WING A/ICE LO HEAT (Caution): 30 R WING A/ICE LO HEAT-CTRL TEMP INOP (Info). (vi) R WING A/ICE LO HEAT (Caution): 30 R WING A/ICE LO HEAT-R HPV FAIL CLSD (Info). (vii) R WING A/ICE LO HEAT (Caution): 30 R WING A/ICE LO HEAT-R WING A/ICE TEMP SNSR INOP (Info). (viii) R WING A/ICE OVHT (Caution): 30 R WING A/ICE OVHT-R WING-A/ICE TEMP SNSR INOP (Info). (ix) WING A/ICE FAULT (Advisory): 30 WING A/ICE FAULT-L WING A/ICE VLV LEAK (Info). (x) WING A/ICE FAULT (Advisory): 30 WING A/ICE FAULT-R WING A/ICE VLV LEAK (Info). (xi) AIR SYSTEM FAULT (Advisory): 36 AIR SYSTEM FAULT-L BLEED MON PRESS SNSR INOP (Info). (xii) AIR SYSTEM FAULT (Advisory): 36 AIR SYSTEM FAULT-R BLEED MON PRESS SNSR INOP (Info). (xiii) L BLEED FAIL (Caution): 36 L BLEED FAIL-L BLEED TEMP SNSR INOP (Info). (xiv) L BLEED FAIL (Caution): 36 L BLEED FAIL-L HPV FAIL CLSD (Info). (xv) L BLEED FAIL (Caution): 36 L BLEED FAIL-L PRESS REG SOV INOP (Info). (xvi) R BLEED FAIL (Caution): 36 R BLEED FAIL-R BLEED TEMP SNSR INOP (Info). (xvii) R BLEED FAIL (Caution): 36 R BLEED FAIL-R HPV FAIL CLSD (Info). (xviii) R BLEED FAIL (Caution): 36 R BLEED FAIL-R PRESS REG SOV INOP (Info). (h) Additional AD Provisions The following provisions also apply to this AD: (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, AIR-520, Continued Operational Safety Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or responsible Flight Standards Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the Continued Operational Safety Branch, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (i) of this AD and email to: AMOC@faa.gov . Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the responsible Flight Standards Office. (2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any requirement in this AD to obtain instructions from a manufacturer, the instructions must be accomplished using a method approved by the Manager, AIR-520, Continued Operational Safety Branch, FAA; or Transport Canada; or Airbus Canada Limited Partnership's Transport Canada Design Approval Organization (DAO). If approved by the DAO, the approval must include the DAO-authorized signature. (i) Additional Information For more information about this AD, contact Michael Bumbaugh, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; phone: 206-231-3522; email: Michael.Bumbaugh@faa.gov. (j) Material Incorporated by Reference None. Issued on July 1, 2026. Brian Knaup, Acting Deputy Director, Integrated Certificate Management Division, Aircraft Certification Service.