Events Leading to the Issuance of This AD
A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an AD that would apply to Raytheon Aircraft Company (Raytheon) (formerly known as Beech Aircraft Corporation) Models E33, F33, G33, E33A, F33A, E33C, F33C, C35, D35, E35, F35, G35, H35, J35, K35, M35, N35, P35, S35, V35, V35A, V35B, V35TC, V35ATC, V35BTC, 36, A36, A36TC, B36TC, 50, B50, C50, 95-55, 95A55, 95B55, 95C55, D55, E55, 56TC, A56TC, 58, 58TC, 95, B95, B95A, D95A, and E95 airplanes was published in the Federal Register on December 23, 1996 (61 FR 67505). The action proposed to require checking the cabin side door and the utility door handle from the interior of the airplane for proper locking. If the handles do not lock, this action proposed to require procedures for re-installing the door handles correctly for the lock to engage. Accomplishment of the proposed action would be in accordance with Raytheon AircraftMandatory Service Bulletin No. 2693, Issued: May 1996.
Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to comments received from three different commenters.
Comment 1: No need for AD action
The first commenter states that the use of the words "may result" or "could occur" in the section titled "Events Leading to the Proposed Action" of the preamble indicates that there have been no actual incidents or accidents because of the improperly installed door handle and there is no need for the AD action.
The FAA does not concur that there is no need for AD action. The FAA uses the phrases "may result" and "could occur" to emphasize the possibility of another incident or accident occurring based on the history and reports of incidents and accidents that have already occurred. The AD preamble is used to describe what the FAA knows has already happened and to justify the possible consequencesif the affected airplane operators do not comply with the AD action. The notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) did not specify the number of occurrences reported on these cabin door handles. There have been nine reports of these door handles not locking properly.
No changes have been made to the final rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 2: No Incidents, Only reports
The same commenter also states that the phrase "incidents described above" in the section titled "Explanation of the Provisions of the Proposed Action" makes reference to incidents described in the preamble and there are no incidents described, but only reports of improperly installed door handles.
The FAA concurs and will change all incident references in the final rule to reports.
Comment 3: Cost Impact
A commenter states that the cost of repetitive inspections and the owners/operators time for the burdensome paperwork that is required to comply with an AD is not figured into the cost of the proposed AD.
The FAA concurs, but states that the cost of the repetitive inspections is not figured into the cost impact per airplane or for the entire U.S. fleet because there are no repetitive inspections proposed in the NPRM. Likewise, the FAA does not estimate the time for paperwork to comply with the proposed AD because the FAA has no reasonable means of obtaining this information.
No changes have been made to the final rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 4: Include subsequent service bulletin revisions in AD
A commenter states that the AD compliance should not only specify that the proposed action be accomplished in accordance with Raytheon Service Bulletin (SB) No. 2693, dated May 1996, but also include any subsequent revisions to the referenced service bulletin.
The FAA does not concur. The FAA cannot approve data that does not exist. Approval of this nature could adversely affect aviation safety if modifications were included in the subsequent servicebulletins that did not carry normal FAA review.
No changes have been made to the final rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 5: Improper installation is not justification for an AD
One commenter explains that AD s normally do not address a potential problem based on an improperly installed part. The commenter states that if AD s were issued on this basis alone, why doesn t the FAA issue AD s to cover the installation of all aircraft parts?
FAA does not concur with this commenter s statement. The NPRM is written because the information provided in the maintenance manual does not cover the re-installation of the door handle, once removed. The NPRM provides the information needed to assure that the door handles are re-installed correctly. The FAA will add a Note in the AD recommending that reference be made to the service bulletin in the maintenance manual.
Comment 6: No Interior Cabin or Utility Doors
A commenter states that a revision is needed in the "Summary" to correctly identify the area to be inspected. As written, the phrase "...interior cabin side door handle and interior utility door handle..." leads the reader to believe there are interior doors on the airplane. There are no interior cabin side doors or interior utility doors.
The FAA concurs and has re-written the "Summary" to correctly describe the doors as "...cabin side door handle and utility door handle from the interior of the airplane..." for better clarification.
Comment 7: Unsafe condition not defined correctly
One commenter states that the phrase "...while in flight....could result in injury to passengers..." is misleading. The commenter states that the airloads on the door after rotation of the airplane should prevent the door from opening, and the only potential for injury is during taxi operations.
The FAA concurs with this statement. After further review of the reports made, the FAA has determined that no injuries have occurred from the door comingajar. As a result, the FAA has changed the statements referring to passenger injury during flight or during taxi operations. Instead, the statement has been changed to "...could result in loss of control of the airplane." The reason for this change is that loss of control of the airplane could result from either a startled passenger grabbing an airplane control should the door come ajar because the door handle lock didn t lock, or the pilot having to lean over and shut the door because a passenger inadvertently leaned on the door handle causing it to come ajar.
Comment 8: Doors were installed correctly at factory
A commenter states that this problem was discovered in the field as a result of removing the door handle and re-installing the handle incorrectly, and the door handles were not installed at the factory incorrectly.
The FAA concurs and has made an effort to clarify the cause of the problem, so as not to imply that the manufacturer is at fault.
No changes weremade as a result of this comment.
Comment 9: Change in compliance time
Another commenter states that a change should be made to the compliance time of the AD. The commenter wants to eliminate the phrase "...whichever occurs first,..." because this implies that the door handle only needs to be checked and corrected one time. The commenter states that repetitive checks are needed to the door handle when removed in the future, and incorrectly re-installed.
The FAA does not concur that the phrase "...whichever occurs first,..." is unnecessary. The purpose for this phrase is to make sure the door handles are checked at the first possible opportunity. This means the operator has 50 hours time-in-service (TIS) to check the door handles, but if the door handles are removed prior to the expiration of that time, the operators must check the door handles and verify that they are locking correctly and does not have to check the door handles at the expiration of 50 hours TIS after theeffective date of the AD.
The FAA is not requiring a repetitive check because the purpose of this AD is to have the entire fleet check the door handles to make sure they are locking correctly. If the door handles are not locking, then the operator should have the door handles re-installed to lock correctly. After the initial check to assure every affected airplane has locking door handles, the FAA is relying on regular maintenance to catch this problem. The FAA will add a Note recommending that reference be made to the service bulletin in the maintenance manual.
Comment 10: Certified/Licensed versus Certificated
All three commenters state that airframe mechanics and pilots are not "licensed" or "certified", but are "certificated." The FAA concurs and has changed all references to "licensed airframe mechanics" or "certified pilots" in the preamble and the AD to read "certificated airframe mechanics: or "certificated pilots."
The FAA's Determination
After careful review of all available information related to the subject presented above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public interest require the adoption of the rule as proposed except editorial corrections mentioned above. The FAA has determined that these corrections will not change the meaning of the AD and will not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed.
Cost Impact
The FAA estimates that 19,000 airplanes in the U.S. registry will be affected by this AD, that it will take approximately 1 workhour per airplane to accomplish the required initial check and there is no labor cost because the check may be performed by the owner/operator holding at least a private pilot certificate as authorized by section 43.7 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 43.7), and must be entered into the aircraft records showing compliance with this AD in accordance with section 43.11 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 43.11). Based on these figures, thereis no initial cost impact of this AD on U.S. operators. This figure is based upon the assumption that no affected airplane owner/operator has accomplished this check. The FAA has no way of determining the number of owners/operators who may have already accomplished this action.
Regulatory Impact
The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a "significant rule" under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the final evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption "ADDRESSES".
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
PART 39 - AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 USC 106(g), 40113, 44701.
39.13 [Amended]
2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding a new airworthiness directive (AD) to read as follows: