Background \n\n\n\tThe FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all The Boeing Company Model 747 series airplanes and Model 767 series airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on September 9, 2020 (85 FR 55622). The NPRM was prompted by a report of an un-commanded fuel transfer between the main and center fuel tanks. The NPRM proposed to prohibit operation of an airplane with any inoperative refuel valve (fueling shut-off valve) failed in the open position. \n\tThe FAA is issuing this AD to address multiple refuel valves failed in the ''open'' position via Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) dispatch allowance, which allows un-commanded fuel transfer between fuel tanks. This condition could result in a fuel exhaustion event. \n\nComments \n\n\n\tThe FAA gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this final rule. The following presents the comments received onthe NPRM and the FAA's response to each comment. \n\nSupport for the NPRM \n\n\n\tUnited Airlines had no objection to the NPRM. Another commenter stated that the NPRM was justified. \n\nRequest To Identify Proposed AD as Interim Action \n\n\n\tBoeing requested that the proposed AD be identified as interim action because it is working on an updated MMEL to provide modified dispatch relief. \n\tThe FAA agrees with the commenter's request for the reason provided by the commenter. The FAA has revised the preamble in this final rule to identify this AD as interim action. \n\nRequest To Clarify Certain Terminology \n\n\n\tBoeing requested that throughout the proposed AD the word ''secured'' be changed to ''failed'' when referring to the fuel shutoff valves. The commenter explained that the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) does not direct operators to secure the fuel shutoff valve open; the MEL states that operators are allowed to operate (dispatch) an airplane with a \n\n((Page 15573)) \n\nvalve failed (inoperative) in the open position. \n\tThe FAA agrees with the commenter's request for the reasons provided by the commenter. The FAA has accordingly revised the description of the unsafe condition and AD requirements in the SUMMARY and Background sections of this final rule, and in paragraphs (e) and (g) of this AD. \n\nRequest for Clarification Regarding Revisions to MMEL Items for Model 747SP Series Airplanes \n\n\n\tA commenter requested clarification regarding revisions to MMEL items for Model 747SP series airplanes. The commenter stated the company he is affiliated with operates two Model 747SP series airplanes and asked if the final instruction would require eliminating ATA 28-20 (2) through (6) from its MEL, or if those sections would be revised with different maintenance instructions, which would allow dispatching an airplane with only one inoperative refueling valve deactivated in the open position, or if there would be a revision to those sections with different maintenance instructions allowing dispatching an airplane with inoperative refueling valves deactivated in the closed position (for example, if the refueling valves could be manually opened on the ground for re-fueling and then closed for flight if only the valve's actuator is defective). \n\tThe FAA provides the following explanations to the commenter's questions. This AD eliminates the relief provided by the dispatch provisions of ATA 28-20 (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) from the Boeing 747 B-747-100/200/300/SP SERIES MMEL. This AD therefore prohibits dispatch of an airplane with any of the subject refuel valves inoperative in the open position, regardless of the existence of any MMEL provisions. If the MMEL items are revised in the future, the FAA might issue global AMOCs to provide relief for operation under specified conditions. This AD does not change the MMEL dispatch provisions for refuel valves inoperative in the closed position. \n\nRequest To Reduce the Compliance Time \n\n\n\tThe Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA) requested that the compliance time specified in the proposed AD be reduced from 60 days after the effective date of the AD to 15 days. The commenter stated that operators have had sufficient time from the publication date of the proposed AD (September 9, 2020) until the publication date of the final rule to address the prohibition of dispatching airplanes with more than one affected refuel valve inoperative. \n\tThe FAA disagrees with the commenter's request. After considering all of the available information, the FAA determined that the compliance time, as proposed, represents an appropriate interval of time for operators to comply with the AD, and still maintain an adequate level of safety. In developing an appropriate compliance time, the FAA considered the safety implications of operating an airplane with any inoperative refuel valve. In addition, reducing the compliance time of the proposed AD would necessitate (under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act) reissuing the notice, reopening the period for public comment, considering additional comments subsequently received, and eventually issuing a final rule. That procedure could add unwarranted time to the rulemaking process. In light of this, and in consideration of the amount of time that has already elapsed since issuance of the original notice, the FAA determined that further delay of this AD is not appropriate. However, if additional data are presented that would justify a shorter compliance time, the FAA may consider further rulemaking on this issue. The FAA has not revised this AD in regard to this issue. \n\nRequest To Include MMEL Item for Model 747-8 Passenger Airplanes \n\n\n\tBoeing and AMES Sarl (CAMO) requested that MMEL Item 28-21-02-01A, ''Refuel Valves,'' which applies to passenger airplanes, be included in paragraph (h)(4) of the proposed AD. The commenters noted that in paragraph (h)(4) of the proposed AD, only MMEL Item 28-21-01-01A, ''Refuel Valves,'' is specified, and that MMEL item is applicable only to Model 747-8F airplanes, which are freighter airplanes. \n\tThe FAA agrees with the commenters' requests for the reasons provided by the commenters and has revised paragraph (h)(4) of this AD accordingly. \n\nRequest To Remove Reference to MMEL Items for Model 767-2C Series Airplanes \n\n\n\tBoeing requested that MMEL items referring to Model 767-2C series airplanes be removed from paragraph (h)(6) of the proposed AD because an FAA-approved MMEL document does not exist for this model. The commenter explained that only a Dispatch Deviation Guide (DDG) has been issued for Model 767-2C series airplanes and that the MMEL items referenced in paragraphs (h)(6)(i) and (ii) of the proposed AD are found only in the DDG and are not public documents; therefore it is not appropriate to reference these MMEL items in the proposed AD. \n\tThe FAA agrees with the commenter's request for the reasons provided by the commenter. The FAA has removed paragraph (h)(6) of this AD because there is no published MMEL for Model 767-2C series airplanes. \n\nRequest To Remove References to Model KC-46A Airplanes \n\n\n\tBoeing requested that all text referring to Model KC-46A airplanes be removed from the NPRM. The commenter explained that for type certification purposes, Model KC-46A airplanes are covered under the type certificate for Model 767-2C series airplanes. \n\tThe FAA agrees with the commenter's request for the reason provided by the commenter. As stated previously, paragraph (h)(6) of the proposed AD, which provided MMEL information for Model 767-2C airplanes, has been removed from this AD. \n\nRequest for Clarification of Affected Fuel Tanks in Paragraph (g) of the Proposed AD \n\n\n\tBoeing requested that paragraph (g) of the proposed AD be revised to clarify which fuel tanks are affected. The commenter stated that the identified unsafe condition is not evident when an airplane is operating using the existing DDG and MMEL relief for fuel tanks with refuel valves that are isolated from the main manifold that provides fuel to the wing tanks. The commenter explained that the fuel tanks that are not affected include the auxiliary tanks and the horizontal stabilizer tank on Model 747 series airplanes and the body fuel tanks on Model 767-2C series airplanes. \n\tThe FAA agrees with the commenter's request. The FAA has determined that this clarification could reduce confusion among operators regarding which fuel tanks are affected by the unsafe condition identified in this AD. The FAA has revised this final rule to clarify that this AD prohibits operation of an airplane with any inoperative refuel valve (fueling shut-off valve) of ''the reserve tank (on Model 747 series airplanes), main tank, or center tank'' that has failed in the open position. \n\nRequest To Revise Paragraph (g) of the Proposed AD To Prohibit Dispatch if More Than One Refuel Valve Is Inoperative \n\n\n\tUnited Parcel Service (UPS Airlines) requested that paragraph (g) of the proposed AD be revised to specify that dispatch of an airplane is allowed if there is only one inoperative refuel valve. The commenter agreed that if \n\n((Page 15574)) \n\nmultiple refuel valves were secured in the open position there could be an un-commanded fuel transfer between fuel tanks. The commenter explained that a review of the fuel control systems on its fleet revealed that the fuel transfer would occur only if two valves were open, each in a different tank. The commenter noted that if only one valve was secured (failed) open, fuel could enter the manifold but could not migrate into a different tank. The commenter stated that it had contacted Boeing regarding dispatch of an airplane with one refuel valve secured in the open position and that Boeing stated this provides an acceptable level of safety to the proposed AD. The commenter explained that Boeing is developing substantiating analysis to support dispatch of an airplane with one refuel valve secured in the open position for many of the affected airplane models. \n\tIn addition, the commenter requested that the repair category be specified as category B (three day deferral) because the replacement of a refuel valve, which involves fuel tank access and requires specialized training and additional time to properly vent the fuel tanks, would place an undue burden on operators when another acceptable alternative is available. \n\tThe FAA does not agree with the commenter's requests. The FAA has determined that the operational limitations imposed by this AD are warranted, and adequately address the unsafe condition. Boeing has not yet finalized or provided the FAA with its substantiating analysis to support dispatch of an airplane with one refuel valve secured in the open position. Boeing has indicated that in the future it might provide updates for the applicable DDG and MMEL for each affected airplane model to provide modified dispatch relief. The FAA has not revised this AD in regard to this issue. \n\nRequest To Revise Paragraph (h) of the Proposed AD To Refer to MEL Instead of MMEL \n\n\n\tBoeing requested that the header for paragraph (h) in the proposed AD be changed from MMEL Items to MEL Items. The commenter also requested that paragraphs (h)(1) through (6) be revised to refer to MEL items instead of MMEL items. The commenter stated that these changes would provide clarification that MEL(s) would be updated and the wording would be consistent with that of similar ADs. \n\tThe FAA partially agrees with the commenter's requests. The FAA agrees with the commenter's statement that operators will need to update their MELs to comply with the change required by this AD. Because dispatch requirements have changed for the applicable airplane models, the FAA disagrees with removing the reference to the identified MMEL items because this AD does not mandate the actual change to the applicable MMEL. This AD identifies which FAA-approved MMEL items are affected. Operators consult the MMEL requirements when updating the operator's existing FAA-approved MEL. The FAA has revised paragraph (h) of this AD accordingly. \n\nRequest To Include Note 2 to Paragraph (h) of the Proposed AD \n\n\n\tBoeing requested that Note 2 be added to paragraph (h) of the proposed AD stating that operators must not dispatch an airplane using MMEL Item 28-21-01 with any of the identified valves in the inoperative open condition. The commenter explained that this would prevent dispatch of an airplane with fueling shutoff valves in the inoperative open condition without requiring a reference to a specific chapter of the MMEL. \n\tThe FAA disagrees with the commenter's request. Not all affected airplanes have MMEL items in section 28-21. Further, the intent of the commenter's proposed text is adequately addressed in the provisions of paragraph (g) of this AD, which is unchanged from the proposed AD. The FAA has not changed this AD as a result of this comment. \n\nConclusion \n\n\n\tThe FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this final rule with the changes described previously and minor editorial changes. The FAA has determined that these minor changes: \n\tAre consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM for addressing the unsafe condition; and \n\tDo not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM. \n\tThe FAA also determined that these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this final rule. \n\nMMEL Revisions \n\n\n\tThis AD refers to items in Sections 28-20 and 28-21 of the MMEL; \1\ those items may also be included in an operator's FAA-approved MEL. This AD prohibits operation of the airplane under conditions currently allowed by those items in the MMEL. The FAA plans to revise the MMEL to remove those items in a future revision; operators would then be required to also remove those items from their existing FAA-approved MEL. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \n\n\n\t\1\ The MMEL items can be found in the applicable FAA-approved MMEL: Boeing 747 B-747-100/200/300/SP SERIES MMEL, Revision 35, dated April 25, 2014; Boeing 747 B-747-400 LCF MMEL, Revision 3, November 7, 2014; Boeing 747 B-747-400, B-747-400D, B-747-400F MMEL, Revision 32, dated December 27, 2018; Boeing 747-8 MMEL, Revision 7, dated August 25, 2017; and Boeing 767 MMEL, Revision 39, dated October 26, 2018; which can be found on the Flight Standards Information Management System (FSIMS) website, https://fsims.faa.gov/PICResults.aspx?mode=Publication&doctype=MMELByModel. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \n\nInterim Action \n\n\n\tThe FAA considers this AD interim action. The manufacturer is currently developing an updated MMEL, with substantiation, that would allow limited relief for an inoperative open fuel shutoff valve and mitigate the unsafe condition. Once the updated MMEL is developed, approved, and available, the FAA might consider additional rulemaking. \n\nCosts of Compliance \n\n\n\tThe FAA estimates that this AD affects 750 airplanes of U.S. registry. \n\tThe FAA has determined that revising the operator's existing FAA- approved MEL takes an average of 90 work-hours per operator, although the agency recognizes that this number may vary from operator to operator. Since operators typically incorporate MEL changes for their affected fleet(s), the FAA has determined that a per-operator estimate is more accurate than a per-airplane estimate. Therefore, the FAA estimates the average total cost per operator to be $7,650 (90 work- hours x $85 per work-hour). \n\nAuthority for This Rulemaking \n\n\n\tTitle 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority. \n\tThe FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an \n\n((Page 15575)) \n\nunsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. \n\nRegulatory Findings \n\n\n\tThis AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. \n\tFor the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD: \n\t(1) Is not a ''significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866, \n\t(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and \n\t(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. \n\nList of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 \n\n\n\tAir transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.