Discussion \n\n\n\tThe EASA, which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, has issued EASA AD 2020-0083, dated April 3, 2020 (''EASA AD 2020-0083'') (also referred to as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information, or ''the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe condition for certain Airbus SAS Model A330-202, -203, -223, -223F, - 243, -243F, -302, -303, -323, -343, and -941 airplanes; and Model A340- 313, -541, and -642 airplanes. \n\tThe FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain Airbus SAS Model A330-202, -203, -223, -223F, -243, -243F, -302, -303, -323, -343, and -941 airplanes; and Model A340-313, -541, and -642 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on May 6, 2020 (85 FR 26896). The NPRM was prompted by the results of laboratory tests on non- rechargeable lithium batteries installed in ELTs, which highlighted a lack of protection againstcurrents of 28 volts DC or 115 volts AC that could lead to thermal runaway and a battery fire. The NPRM proposed to require modifying a certain ELT by installing a diode between the ELT and the terminal block, as specified in EASA AD 2020-0083. \n\nComments \n\n\n\tThe FAA gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this final rule. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM and the FAA's response to each comment. \n\nRequest To Allow Any Color and Width of Tape \n\n\n\tDelta Air Lines (DAL) requested that operators be allowed to use any color and width of reinforced silicon tape, instead of part number (P/N) ASNA51072503, to protect the wiring in the area where the diode is secured to the harness. The commenter explained that P/N ASNA51072503 is specified in Airbus Service Bulletin A330-25-3733 (''Airbus Service Bulletin A330-25-3733''), and is for the 1-inch orange reinforced silicon tape under the ASNA5107 standard (which is an aerospace industry standard for a silicone rubber tape). The commenter requested approval to use any color and width of reinforced silicon tape meeting \n\n((Page 63439)) \n\nthe specifications of the broader ASNA5107 standard. The commenter explained that the specified reinforced silicon tape has a shelf-life, and it would be beneficial to operators if they were given the flexibility to use any color and width of reinforced silicon tape if the reinforced silicon tape is needed to be replaced during maintenance. \n\tThe FAA does not agree with the commenter's request. The commenter did not provide sufficient justification for the use of any color and width of reinforced silicon tape meeting the specifications of the broader ASNA5107 standard. The FAA is not aware of the airworthiness quality of other reinforced silicon tapes under specification ASNA5107. Furthermore, all self-adhesive tapes under the ASNA5107 standard, and their alternatives, have limited shelf lives. The reinforced silicon tape having P/N ASNA51072503 is included in the parts kit specified in Airbus Service Bulletin A330-25-3733 and will be delivered to operators. Airbus, as the Design Approval Holder (DAH), may authorize using alternate materials, which may be included in revised Airbus service information. Operators may, however, request alternative methods of compliance to use reinforced silicone tape other than P/N ASNA51072503 by following the procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD and demonstrating how this alternative addresses the unsafe condition. The FAA has not revised this AD in regard to this issue. \n\nRequest To Allow an Alternative Continuity Check \n\n\n\tIn addition, DAL requested and provided an option to replace Step 3.C.(h) specified in Airbus Service Bulletin A330-25-3733. The commenter explained that Step 3.C.(h) in Airbus Service Bulletin A330- 25-3733 requires a continuity test of the modified wiring and provides no specific steps for this test other than referencing Electrical StandardPractices Manual (ESPM) section 20-52-21. The commenter noted that although this ESPM section does provide basic continuity procedures, it fails to provide a procedure for a wire with a diode installed. \n\tThe FAA disagrees with the commenter's request. The FAA has determined that the procedures described in ESPM section 20-52-21 provide an adequate method for performing a continuity test using a standard multimeter. When placing the multimeter probes in the correct position, the operator is instructed to refer to the wiring schematic within Airbus Service Bulletin A330-25-3733, which provides the necessary procedures for a wire with a diode installed. In addition, anode/cathode polarization is depicted on the diode's housing. Furthermore, Airbus Service Bulletin A330-25-3733 specifies that after the wiring modification is done, a built-in test equipment (BITE) test of the ELT should be performed. The BITE test is also adequate to reveal an incorrectly installed diode. \n\tIn addition,the commenter did not provide justification regarding how its proposed procedure would maintain the airworthiness of the airplane. Operators may, however, request alternative methods of compliance to replace Step 3.C.(h) specified in Airbus Service Bulletin A330-25-3733 by using the procedures described in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD and demonstrating how this alternative addresses the unsafe condition. The FAA has not changed this AD regarding this issue. \n\nConclusion \n\n\n\tThe FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this final rule as proposed, except for minor editorial changes. The FAA has determined that these minor changes: \n\tAre consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM for addressing the unsafe condition; and \n\tDo not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM. \n\nRelated IBR Material Under 1 CFR Part 51 \n\n\n\tEASA AD 2020-0083 describes procedures for modifying a certain ELT by installing a diode between the ELT and the terminal block. This material is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section. \n\nCosts of Compliance \n\n\n\tThe FAA estimates that this AD affects 12 airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD: \n\n\n\tEstimated Costs for Required Actions ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \n\tCost per Cost on U.S. \n\tLabor cost Parts cost product operators ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 work-hours x $85 per hour = $255........................... $460 $715 $8,580 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \n\n\n\tAccording to the manufacturer, some or all of the costs of this AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected individuals. The FAA does not control warranty coverage for affected individuals. As a result, the FAA has included all known costs in our cost estimate. \n\nAuthority for This Rulemaking \n\n\n\tTitle 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority. \n\tThe FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. \n\nRegulatory Findings \n\n\n\tThis AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. \n\tFor the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD: \n\t(1) Is not a ''significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866, \n\t(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and \n\n((Page 63440)) \n\n\n\t(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. \n\nList of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 \n\n\n\tAir transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.