Discussion \n\n\n\tTransport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA), which is the aviation authority for Canada, has issued Canadian AD CF-2018-32, dated December 10, 2018 (referred to after this as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information, or ''the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe condition for all Bombardier, Inc., Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes, Model CL-600-2C10 (Regional Jet Series 700, 701 & 702) airplanes, Model CL-600-2D15 (Regional Jet Series 705) airplanes, Model CL-600-2D24 (Regional Jet \n\n((Page 440)) \n\nSeries 900) airplanes, and Model CL-600-2E25 (Regional Jet Series 1000) airplanes. \n\tThe FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to the airplanes identified in the MCAI. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on May 14, 2019 (84 FR 21276). The NPRM was prompted by a report that during AFCS ALTS CAP or (V) ALTS CAP mode the flight guidance/autopilot does not account for engine failure while capturing an altitude. The NPRM proposed to require revising the existing AFM to include a limitation and abnormal operating procedure for the AFCS. \n\tThe FAA is issuing this AD to address an engine failure, if it occurs during or before a climb while in ALTS CAP or (V) ALTS CAP mode, which may cause the airspeed to drop significantly below the safe operating speed, possibly resulting in reduced control of the airplane. See the MCAI for additional background information. \n\nComments \n\n\n\tThe FAA gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this final rule. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM and the FAA's response to each comment. \n\nSupport for the NPRM \n\n\n\tThe Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA) indicated its support for the NPRM. Endeavor Air stated that it has no objection to adding a requirement to revise the existing AFM to include the information in Subject 2, ''Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS),'' of Section 02-08, ''System Limitations,'' of Chapter 2, ''LIMITATIONS,'' of the applicable Bombardier AFM. \n\nRequest To Remove a Proposed Requirement \n\n\n\tEndeavor Air stated that it disagreed with the proposed requirement to revise the existing AFM to include the information in Subject C, ''Engine Failure in Climb During ALTS CAP,'' or ''Engine Failure in Climb During (V) ALTS CAP,'' of Section 05-02, ''In-flight Engine Failures,'' of Chapter 5, ''ABNORMAL PROCEDURES,'' as applicable, of the applicable Bombardier AFM. The commenter stated that the increased pilot workload of having to accomplish two independent quick reference handbook procedures following an engine failure would reduce the safety margins. The commenter explained that when an engine failure occurs during (V) ALTS CAP mode, the resulting speed decay is minimal given a worst-case scenario of climbing at a slow airspeed with a high rate of climb, which could result in the greatest amountof time in (V) ALTS CAP mode. The commenter further explained that by the time the pilot flying the airplane called for the procedure and disconnected the autopilot, the (V) ALTS CAP phase would be over and the airplane would be in level flight. The commenter mentioned that the decrease in automation and increase in pilot workload could reduce the pilot's situational awareness of the engine failure malfunction and the state of the airplane. \n\tThe FAA infers that the commenter is requesting that the requirement to revise the existing AFM to include the information specified in Subject C, ''Engine Failure in Climb During ALTS CAP,'' or ''Engine Failure in Climb During (V) ALTS CAP,'' of Section 05-02, ''In-flight Engine Failures,'' of Chapter 5, ''ABNORMAL PROCEDURES,'' of the applicable Bombardier AFM be removed from this AD. The FAA disagrees with the commenter's request. In ALTS CAP mode the speed control is on thrust; therefore, the loss of a single engine would result in airspeed decay if the flight director guidance was followed by the autopilot or flight director commands. \n\tFurthermore, for the Model CL-600-2C10 (Regional Jet Series 700, 701 & 702) airplanes, Model CL-600-2D15 (Regional Jet Series 705) airplanes, Model CL-600-2D24 (Regional Jet Series 900) airplanes, and Model CL-600-2E25 (Regional Jet Series 1000) airplanes, a simulation showed that at certain weights, VMCA (the minimum control speed in the air) could be reached before the stall warning occurred, with the potential for loss of control of the airplane if the flight director commands were followed without any pilot action to otherwise control speed with pitch attitude. In some worst-case conditions, to ensure a safe speed, the automation (autopilot) must be disconnected. \n\tIn addition, the purpose of the AFM abnormal procedure is to ensure flightcrew awareness of the requirement to disconnect the autopilot and control the airspeed with pitch attitude. In regard to increased pilot workload, the FAA considered that a pilot of at least average skill would, in most cases, intuitively disconnect the autopilot and control speed manually in the event of a large deceleration while in ALTS CAP mode. The intent of the AFM abnormal procedure is to provide instructions for the steps required to maintain speed control, as opposed to a checklist in a quick reference handbook to address such a situation if encountered. Furthermore, in some conditions, the duration of ALTS CAP mode may be short enough that the airspeed decay may not be large, but the AFM must address the worst-case conditions. The FAA has not revised this AD in regard to this issue. \n\nConclusion \n\n\n\tThe FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this final rule as proposed, except for minor editorial changes. The FAA has determined that these minor changes: \n\tAre consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM for addressing the unsafe condition; and \n\tDo not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM. \n\nRelated Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51 \n\n\n\tBombardier has issued the following service information, which describes procedures for revising the existing AFM by including a limitation that specifies a warning for the AFCS and an abnormal operating procedure if an engine failure occurs during or before a climb while in ALTS CAP mode or if an engine failure occurs during or before a climb while in (V) ALTS CAP mode. These documents are distinct since they apply to different airplane models. \n\tSubject 2, ''Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS),'' of Section 02-08, ''System Limitations,'' of Chapter 2, ''LIMITATIONS;'' and Subject 1.C, ''Engine Failure in Climb During ALTS CAP,'' and Subject 1.C, ''Engine Failure in Climb During (V) ALTS CAP,'' of Section 05-02, ''In-flight Engine Failures,'' of Chapter 5, ''ABNORMAL PROCEDURES;'' of the Bombardier CRJ Series Regional Jet Model CL-600- 2B19 AFM, Volume 1, CSP A-012, Revision 70, dated July 13, 2018. \n\tSubject 2,'' Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS),'' of Section 02-08, ''System Limitations,'' of Chapter 2, ''LIMITATIONS;'' and Subject 1.C, ''Engine Failure in Climb During ALTS CAP,'' and Subject 1.C, ''Engine Failure in Climb During (V) ALTS CAP,'' of Section 05-02, ''In-flight Engine Failures,'' of Chapter 5, ''ABNORMAL PROCEDURES;'' of the Bombardier CRJ Series Regional Jet CL-600-2C10, AFM CSP B-012, Revision 24, dated May 11, 2018. \n\tSubject 2, ''Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS),'' of Section 02- \n\n((Page 441)) \n\n08, ''System Limitations,'' of Chapter 2, ''LIMITATIONS;'' and Subject 1.C, ''Engine Failure in Climb During ALTS CAP,'' and Subject 1.C, ''Engine Failure in Climb During (V) ALTS CAP,'' of Section 05-02, ''In-flight Engine Failures,'' of Chapter 5, ''ABNORMAL PROCEDURES;'' of the Bombardier CRJ Series Regional Jet Model CL-600-2D24 and CL-600- 2D15 AFM, Volume 1, CSP C-012, Revision 19A, dated August 17, 2018. \n\tSubject 2, ''Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS),'' of Section 02-08, ''System Limitations,'' of Chapter 2, ''LIMITATIONS;'' and Subject 1.C, ''Engine Failure in Climb During ALTS CAP,'' and Subject 1.C, ''Engine Failure in Climb During (V) ALTS CAP,'' of Section 05-02, ''In-flight Engine Failures,'' of Chapter 5, ''ABNORMAL PROCEDURES;'' of the Bombardier CRJ Series Regional Jet Model CL-600- 2E25 AFM CSP D-012, Revision 20, dated September 28, 2018. \n\tThis service information is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section. \n\nCosts of Compliance \n\n\n\tThe FAA estimates that this AD affects 985 airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD: \n\n\n\tEstimated Costs for Required Actions ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \n\tCost per Cost on U.S. \n\tLabor cost Parts cost product operators ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 work-hour x $85 per hour = $85............................. $0 $85 $83,725 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \n\nAuthority for This Rulemaking \n\n\n\tTitle 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority. \n\tThe FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ''General requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. \n\tThis AD is issued in accordance with authority delegated by the Executive Director, Aircraft Certification Service, as authorized by FAA Order 8000.51C. In accordance with that order, issuance of ADs is normally a function of the Compliance and Airworthiness Division, but during this transition period, the Executive Director has delegated the authority to issue ADs applicable to transport category airplanes and associated appliances to the Director of the System Oversight Division. \n\nRegulatory Findings \n\n\n\tThis AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. \n\tFor the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD: \n\t(1) Is not a ''significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866, \n\t(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and \n\t(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. \n\nList of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 \n\n\n\tAir transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.