Comments Invited
This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety, and we did not provide you with notice and an opportunity to provide your comments prior to it becoming effective. However, we invite you to participate in this rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. We also invite comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impacts that resulted from adopting this AD. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the AD, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain duplicate comments, commenters should send only one copy of written comments, or if comments are filed electronically, commenters should submit them only one time. We will file in the docket all comments that we receive, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this rulemaking duringthe comment period. We will consider all the comments we receive and may conduct additional rulemaking based on those comments.
Discussion
We propose to adopt a new AD for Sikorsky Model S-92A helicopters with certain main rotor or tail rotor control pushrods installed. After a review of a failed pushrod, Sikorsky investigated the airworthiness of pushrods installed on its helicopters. The investigation indicates that the pushrods installed on Model S-92A helicopters may have incorrect safety cable routing, incorrect jam nut torque, and/or incorrect locking device serrations and key engagement. This AD consequently requires inspecting the pushrods for safety cable routing, engagement of serrations of the locking device, engagement of keys on the locking device, thread engagement, and jam nut torque. This AD requires either repairing or replacing the pushrod assembly, depending on the inspection's outcome. These AD actions are intended to detect and correct an incorrectly installed locking mechanism resulting in a loose jam nut, failure of the pushrods, loss of main rotor or tail rotor flight control, and consequent loss of helicopter control.
FAA's Determination
We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all the relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of these same type designs.
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Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51
We reviewed Sikorsky S-92 Helicopter Alert Service Bulletin ASB 92- 67-006, Revision A, dated February 19, 2016 (ASB), which specifies a one-time inspection of the pushrod assemblies for safety cable routing, engagement of serrations of the locking device, engagement of keys on the locking device, thread engagement, and torque of the jam nuts. The ASB also specifies documenting any non-compliant inspection results and, if any discrepancies are found during the inspection, removing, reworking, and reinstalling or replacing the pushrod. The ASB specifies performing a rig check as required.
This service information is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.
AD Requirements
This AD requires within 5 hours time-in-service (TIS):
For each pushrod adjustable end, except for the upper deck quadrant pushrod, removing the safety cable and using finger pressure, inspecting each jam nut for movement. If a jam nut moves with finger pressure, removing the pushrod assembly from service.
[cir] Inspecting to determine whether a 0.02 inch diameter safety wire can pass through the inspection hole. If the safety wire passes through the inspection hole, repairing the pushrod, which is terminating action for that adjustable end.
[cir] Inspecting for correct engagement of serrations and keys of the locking device. If a locking device is not correctly engaged, repairing the locking device, which is terminating action for that adjustable end.
[cir] Torqueing each jam nut and installing the safety cable, making sure the right-hand threads have safety cable correctly routed, and the left-hand threads have safety cable correctly routed.
For the upper deck quadrant pushrod, this AD requires determining whether there is any gap between the jam nut, locking device, and the adjustable end. It also requires:
[cir] If there is a gap, gaining access to the pushrod, removing the safety cable and using finger pressure, inspecting the jam nut for movement. If the jam nut moves with finger pressure, removing the pushrod assembly from service. If the jam nut does not move, performing corrective actions.
[cir] If there is no gap, visually inspecting the adjustable end for correct safety cable routing, correct engagement of serrations and keys of the locking device, and determining whether any thread is visible in the inspection hole. If the safety cableis routed incorrectly, if the locking device is not correctly engaged, or if there is no thread in the inspection hole, gaining access to the pushrod. Using finger pressure, inspecting the jam nut for movement. If the jam nut moves with finger pressure, removing the pushrod assembly from service. If the jam nut does not move with finger pressure, performing corrective actions.
Differences Between This AD and the Service Information
Sikorsky specifies compliance by May 16, 2016. We require compliance within 5 hours TIS. We also do not require you to contact Sikorsky or record information on the Pushrod Data Sheet.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD will affect 80 helicopters of U.S. Registry and labor costs average $85 per work-hour. Based on these estimates, we expect the following costs:
Inspecting all pushrod assemblies requires 2 work-hours for a labor cost of $170. No parts are needed for a total fleet cost of $13,600.
Replacing a pushrod requires 2 work-hours for a labor cost $170. Parts cost an average of $2,500 for a total cost of $2,670 per pushrod.
Repairing a pushrod requires an average 2 work-hours per helicopter for a labor cost of $170 and minimal part costs.
FAA's Justification and Determination of the Effective Date
Providing an opportunity for public comments prior to adopting these AD requirements would delay implementing the safety actions needed to correct this known unsafe condition. Therefore, we find that the risk to the flying public justifies waiving notice and comment prior to the adoption of this rule because the required corrective actions must be accomplished within 5 hours TIS.
Since an unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD, we determined that notice and opportunity for prior public comment before issuing this AD are impracticable and contrary to the public interest and that good cause exists to make this AD effective in less than 30 days.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in ``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD willnot have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed, I certify that this AD:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);
3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska to the extent that it justifies making a regulatory distinction; and
4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared an economic evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.