Discussion \n\n\n\tWe issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain The Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on December 29, 2014 (79 FR 77970). The NPRM was prompted by reports that six fasteners may not have been installed in the left and right S-37 between BS 428 and 431 lap splices on certain airplanes. The NPRM proposed to require a general visual inspection of S-37 lap splices for missing fasteners, and all applicable related investigative and corrective actions. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct missing fasteners, which could result in cracks in the fuselage skin that could adversely affect the structural integrity of the airplane. \n\nComments \n\n\n\tWe gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM (79 FR 77970, December 29, 2014) and the FAA's response to each comment. \n\nSupport for the NPRM (79 FR 77970, December 29, 2014) \n\n\n\tBoeing and Debra Abdou supported the NPRM (79 FR 77970, December 29, 2014). FedEx Express explained that the NPRM will not impact them. United Airlines stated that it has no comment on the NPRM. \n\nRequest for Credit for Previous Actions \n\n\n\tUnited Parcel Service (UPS) requested that we revise the NPRM (79 FR 77970, December 29, 2014), to clarify that no further actions are required for airplanes that have previously accomplished inspections and corrective actions as specified in Boeing Message TBC-UPS-13-0004- 01B (Service Request 1-2412169241), dated February 1, 2013. \n\tUPS explained that, prior to the release of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated August 7, 2013, Boeing had released Boeing Fleet Team Digest article 767-FTD-53-12003, dated September 21, 2012; and Boeing Message TBC-UPS-13-0004-01B (Service Request 1-2412169241), dated February 1, 2013; to address the discrepant condition and provide applicable corrective actions. UPS stated that it has previously accomplished inspections and corrective actions on all affected UPS Model 767-300F series airplanes in accordance with Boeing Fleet Team Digest article 767-FTD-53-12003 dated September 21, 2012, and Boeing Message TBC-UPS-13-0004-01B (Service Request 1-2412169241), dated February 1, 2013. Per Boeing Message TBC-UPS-13-0004-01B (Service Request 1-2412169241), dated February 1, 2013, the following corrective actions are to be accomplished prior to further flight if the affected fasteners are found missing: \n\tRemove the center row and adjacent fasteners around the missing fastener locations. \n\tPerform open-hole high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspection for damages. \n\tIf no damage is found, install BACR15FV6KE* rivets per the Boeing installation drawing. \n\tIf damage is found, repair per the service repair manual section defined in the future service bulletin. \n\tUPS reasoned that, as indicated in Boeing Message TBC-UPS-13-0004- 01B (Service Request 1-2412169241), dated February 1, 2013, the additional detailed inspection shown in Figure 2, Step 1, of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated August 7, 2013, is not required to detect damages resulting from the discrepant condition. UPS expressed that, as supported by Boeing Message TBC-UPS-13-0004-01B (Service Request 1-2412169241), dated February 1, 2013, the open-hole HFEC inspection is sufficient for detecting and eliminating damage resulting from the identified unsafe condition. UPS pointed out that standard maintenance procedures ensure that the external and internal areas accessed and disturbed during accomplishment of the repair are restored to normal configuration. Furthermore, UPS explained that supplemental internal and external inspections of the affected area are accomplished per UPS maintenance program as specified in Boeing Maintenance Planning Document Items 53-460-00, 53-648-00, 53-800-00, and 53-820-00.We disagree to provide credit for certain actions required by this AD if those actions were performed before the effective date of this AD using Boeing Message TBC-UPS-13-0004-01B (Service Request 1-2412169241) dated February 1, 2013. It is possible that individual instructions provided to the specific operator via Boeing Message TBC-UPS-13-0004- 01B (Service Request 1-2412169241), dated February 1, 2013, may have different instructions than those specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated August 7, 2013. However, under the provisions of paragraph (i) of this AD, we will consider requests for approval of credit for certain actions if sufficient data are submitted to substantiate that the change would provide an acceptable level of safety. We have made no changes to this AD in this regard. \n\nEffect of Winglets on AD \n\n\n\tAviation Partners Boeing stated that accomplishing the supplemental type certificate (STC) ST01920SE (http://rgl.faa.gov/ Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgstc.nsf/0/ 59027f43b9a7486e86257b1d006591ee/$FILE/ST01920SE.pdf) does not affect the actions specified in the NPRM (79 FR 77970, December 29, 2014). We concur with the commenter. We have redesignated paragraph (c) of the proposed AD as paragraph (c)(1) and added new paragraph (c)(2) to this AD to state that installation of STC ST01920SE does not affect the ability to accomplish the actions required by this final rule. Therefore, for airplanes on which STC ST01920SE is installed, a ''change in product'' alternative method of compliance (AMOC) approval request is not necessary to comply with the requirements of 14 CFR 39.17. \n\nRelated Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51 \n\n\n\tBoeing has issued Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0251, dated August 7, 2013. The service information describes procedures for an external general visual inspection of the S-37 lap splice for missing fasteners, detailed and open-hole inspections of the skin for any crack, corrosion, or other discrepancy; determining if the crack, corrosion, or other discrepancy is within the repair limits, and repairing. This service information is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means \n\n((Page 58348)) \n\nidentified in the ADDRESSES section of this AD. \n\nConclusion \n\n\n\tWe reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial changes. We have determined that these minor changes: \n\tAre consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 77970, December 29, 2014) for correcting the unsafe condition; and \n\tDo not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 77970, December 29, 2014). \n\nCosts of Compliance \n\n\n\tWe estimate that this AD affects 23 airplanes of U.S.registry. \n\tWe estimate the following costs to comply with this AD: \n\n\n\tEstimated Costs ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \n\tCost per Cost on U.S. \n\tAction Labor cost Parts cost product operators ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- General visual inspection........... 1 work-hour x $85 per $0 $85 $1,955 \n\thour = $85. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \n\n\n\tWe estimate the following costs to do any necessary inspections/ installations that would be required based on the results of the required inspection. We have no way of determining the number of aircraft that might need these inspections/installations: \n\n\n\tOn-Condition Costs ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \n\tCost per \n\tAction Labor cost Parts cost product ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Detailed and HFEC inspections and fastener 13 work-hours x $85 per hour = * $1,105 \n\tinstallation. $1,105. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \n* All parts that are required are supplied by the operator. This cost is minimal, and we have no way to\n\n\tdetermine what the operators would pay for these parts. \n\n\n\tWe have received no definitive data that would enable us to provide cost estimates for the repairs specified in this AD. \n\tAccording to the manufacturer, some of the costs of this AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected individuals. We do not control warranty coverage for affected individuals. As a result, we have included all costs in our cost estimate. \n\nAuthority for This Rulemaking \n\n\n\tTitle 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority. \n\tWe are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ''General requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. \n\nRegulatory Findings \n\n\n\tThis AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. \n\tFor the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD: \n\t(1) Is not a ''significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866, \n\t(2) Is not a ''significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), \n\t(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and \n\t(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. \n\nList of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 \n\n\n\tAir transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.