Discussion \n\n\n\tWe issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain the Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes modified by particular supplemental type certificates (STCs). The NPRM published in the Federal Register on August 5, 2013 (78 FR 47233). The NPRM was prompted by reports of cracks found during inspections of the in-flight entertainment system radome assembly. The NPRM proposed to require repetitive detailed inspections for cracks in the radome assembly, and replacement of the radome if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in the in-flight entertainment system radome assembly, which could result in the radome (or pieces) separating from the airplane and striking the tail, and consequently reducing the controllability of the airplane. \n\nComments \n\n\n\tWe gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. The following presents the comments received on the proposal (78 FR 47233, August 5, 2013) and the FAA's response to each comment. \n\tBoeing stated that it does not have sufficient information regarding the supplemental type certificates (STCs) referenced in the NPRM (78 FR 47233, August 5, 2013); therefore, it has no comment. \n\tAviation Partners Boeing stated that the installation of winglets per STC ST00830SE (http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory;--and--Guidance-- Library/rgstc.nsf/0/ DA95C49000906C7086257BE80044D3D9?OpenDocument&Highlight=st00830se) does not affect the accomplishment of the manufacturer's service instructions. \n\nRequest To Remove Reporting Requirement \n\n\n\tUnited Air Lines (UAL) requested that the FAA and Live TV re- evaluate the need for the reporting requirement proposed in paragraph (h) of the NPRM (78 FR 47233, August 5, 2013), and remove this proposed requirement. UAL questioned why operators would be required to fill out the service bulletin reporting form provided in Live TV Service Bulletin B737-53-0011, dated March 29, 2013, mentioned in paragraph (h) of the NPRM, and send it to Live TV every time cracking is found on a radome. UAL stated that any radome with cracking would be sent back to the manufacturer with an unserviceable tag attached and that the information on the tag would be the same information requested on the service bulletin reporting form. UAL also noted that the information requested on the reporting form is redundant because the reporting form states that when cracking is found on a radome, the technician has to record his or her name, service work order, and location of accomplishment. \n\tWe do not agree to remove the reporting requirement from this final rule. For this AD, Live TV is the STC design approval holder (DAH) and is gathering information reported by operators and reporting this information to the FAA. There is no regulatory requirement for an operator to return a part to a manufacturer. Regarding this final rule, we agree that an operator may voluntarily provide a cracked radome to Live TV, the STC DAH; however, if a reporting requirement was not mandated by this AD, an operator might elect to repair a cracked radome itself, or send it to another facility for repair, instead of sending it to Live TV, so the information requested in the reporting requirement might not be shared with Live TV. We have not changed this final rule in this regard. \n\nRequest for Reporting Guidance \n\n\n\tUAL noted that the NPRM (78 FR 47233, August 5, 2013) proposed to require operators to record and report the serial number of any cracked radome. UAL stated that numerous times it has discovered that the radome data plate, which has the serial number specified on it, is missing. UAL commented that it can be difficult to use an operator's record keeping system to determine the serial number of a radome because the radome could have been rotated among airplanes. UAL requested guidance regarding what to do if the data plate is missing from a radome. \n\tWe agree that the serial number is an important piece of information for the reporting requirement of this final rule. However, this final rule does not require an operator to identify the radome's serial number prior to inspection. The reporting requirement is only required if cracking is found in the radome during the inspection. If cracking is found during the inspection an operator has 30 days to provide the report. This timeframe should be sufficient for operators to identify the radome's serial number by looking at the data plate or the searching the operator's tracking system. The reporting requirement is meant to help Live TV and the FAA trace back to the fabrication records for potential causes of cracking in the radome. \n\tBased on review and consideration during Weibull Analysis, we believe that rotating radomes among airplanes is not a common occurrence. It is ultimately the operator's responsibility to maintain its airplane configurations and subsequently provide the required serial number information. We have not changed this final rule in this regard. \n\nConclusion \n\n\n\tWe reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial changes. We have determined that these minor changes: \n\t(Agr)re consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM (78 FR 47233, August 5, 2013) for correcting the unsafe condition; and \n\tDo not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM (78 FR 47233, August 5, 2013). \n\tWe also determined that these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD. \n\nCosts of Compliance \n\n\n\tWe estimate that this AD affects 165 airplanes of U.S. registry. \n\tWe estimate the following costs to comply with this AD: \n\n((Page 10339)) \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\tEstimated Costs ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \n\tCost on U.S. \n\tAction Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product operators ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Inspections..................... 1 work-hour x $85 N/A $85, per inspection $14,025, per \n\tper hour = $85, cycle. inspection cycle \n\tper inspection \n\tcycle. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \n\n\n\tWe estimate the following costs to do any necessary replacements that would be required based on the results of the inspections. We have no way of determining the number of aircraft that might need this replacement: \n\n\n\tOn-Condition Costs ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \n\tCost per \n\tAction Labor cost Parts cost product ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Replacement.................................. 8 work-hours x $85 per hour = $23,000 $23,680 \n\t$680. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \n\nPaperwork Reduction Act \n\n\n\tA federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to penalty for failure to comply with a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a current valid OMB control number. The control number for the collection of information required by this AD is 2120- 0056. The paperwork cost associated with this AD has been detailed in the Costs of Compliance section of this document and includes time for reviewing instructions, as well as completing and reviewing the collection of information. Therefore, all reporting associated with this AD is mandatory. Comments concerning the accuracy of this burden and suggestions for reducing the burden should be directed to the FAA at 800 Independence Ave. SW., Washington, DC 20591, ATTN: Information Collection Clearance Officer, AES-200. \n\nAuthority for This Rulemaking \n\n\n\tTitle 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority. \n\tWe are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ''General requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. \n\nRegulatory Findings \n\n\n\tThis AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. \n\tFor the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD: \n\t(1) Is not a ''significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866, \n\t(2) Is not a ''significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), \n\t(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and \n\t(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. \n\nList of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 \n\n\n\tAir transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.