Discussion \n\n\n\tWe issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products. That NPRM published in the Federal Register on April 18, 2012 (77 FR 23166). That NPRM proposed to require adding design features to detect electrical faults, to detect a pump running in an empty fuel tank, and to ensure that a fuel pump's operation is not affected by certain conditions. \n\nComments \n\n\n\tWe gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. The following presents the comments received on the proposal (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) and the FAA's response to each comment. \n\nSupport for NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) \n\n\n\tAirline Pilots Association International (ALPA) supports the language and intent of the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012), and agreed that the proposed actions will enhance safety. \n\nRequest To Delay AD Pending Release of Service InformationTwo commenters requested that we delay issuing the AD until Boeing has released service information. (Specific modifications and solutions were not included in the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012).) \n\tNoting that Boeing had planned to issue several service bulletins to prevent the identified unsafe condition, FedEx requested that we delay issuing the AD until Boeing has released relevant service information. FedEx recommended that we coordinate with Boeing on recommendations to address the unsafe condition. \n\tUPS requested that we extend the comment period until a minimum of 45 days after publication of all associated service bulletins to provide operators sufficient information to make the design changes. \n\tWe do not agree to delay issuance of this AD. We have identified a potential unsafe condition that needs to be corrected; however, Boeing has not finalized service information to address that condition. In light of the unsafe condition, we have determined that we cannotdelay issuance of this AD, and must proceed without service information. We find that the 60-month time frame specified in paragraph (g) of this AD will provide adequate time for issuance and implementation of service information. We have not changed this final rule regarding this issue. \n\nRequest To Revise Applicability \n\n\n\tFedEx and Boeing requested that we revise the applicability to specifically exclude airplanes on which the auxiliary fuel tanks have been removed. FedEx reported that it has modified several MD-11s and MD-10s by removing the forward auxiliary tanks or center auxiliary tanks, as well as the fuel pumps and related hardware. \n\tWe agree that removal of the auxiliary fuel tank eliminates the identified unsafe condition. We have changed paragraph (g) in this final rule to exclude airplanes when Boeing-installed auxiliary fuel tanks are removed. \n\nRequest To Clarify Intent of Proposed Actions \n\n\n\tFedEx stated that certain language in the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) may be too broad. By way of example, FedEx cited the requirement to add design features ''to detect electrical faults.'' Inferring that this required detecting all electrical faults, FedEx asserted that, even if a device could detect all electrical faults, the cost of its installation would be prohibitive. FedEx recommended limiting the requirement to specify detecting ''certain'' electrical faults. \n\tWe disagree that it is necessary to change the AD. The NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) intentionally described certain failure conditions in broad terms. The intent was to provide operators unrestricted options to define design changes based on individual safety assessments. Certain electrical faults may be single failures or a combination of failures such as phase-to-phase shorts, phase-to- ground shorts, and over-voltage or over-current electrical failure conditions. \n\nRequest To Revise Cost Estimate \n\n\n\tFedEx questioned how the FAA determined the estimated cost ofthe modification, since the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) provided no information about specific proposed modifications or required parts. FedEx suggested that the estimated cost would be different for each fleet type. UPS questioned the accuracy of the cost estimates in the NPRM, given the lack of technical data. \n\tBased on current efforts developing service information, Boeing estimated that modification labor costs could vary from 111 to 280 hours depending on the number of pumps on an airplane. Boeing also reported that the AD affects about 341 U.S.-registered airplanes (not 180 airplanes, as stated in the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012)). Boeing requested that we revise the costs of compliance accordingly. \n\tThe estimated costs in the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) were based on recent design change solutions installed on similar center wing tanks on transport category airplanes. We have revised the cost estimate in this final rule to reflect Boeing's updated figures, including increased work hours (152 hours) and parts costs ($137,500), based on an average of 10 pumps per airplane. No single cost figure will be accurate for all operators, however, since labor and parts costs will vary depending on the type of certified design change solutions provided by the operators. \n\nRequest for Terminating Action \n\n\n\tUPS stated that overall safety would be better met if protective devices (fault current detectors) were installed for all 17 pumps on its Model MD-11 airplanes--regardless of tank location. UPS requested that we revise the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) to specify that installing fault current detectors \n\n((Page 24039)) \n\nterminates the 18-month repetitive inspection requirement on the ''epocast'' fuel pump connector, part number (P/N) 60-84351, as mandated by AD 2002-13-10, Amendment 39-12798 (67 FR 45053, July 8, 2002), or AD 2011-11-05, Amendment 39-16704 (76 FR 31462, June 1, 2011). (Those ADs address the same unsafe condition identified in this AD, on the same affected airplanes.) \n\tWe agree that compliance with the requirements of this AD is considered terminating action for the two referenced ADs. Physical inspection of all pumps every 18 months would be labor intensive and time consuming. Further, Boeing has not provided service information to otherwise preclude use of any other pumps during flight. We have changed paragraph (g)(1) in this final rule to require protective devices on electrically powered alternate current (AC) fuel pumps installed in fuel tanks that normally empty during flight. (This proposed requirement in the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) extended to any electrically powered fuel pump in those tanks.) We have added new paragraph (h) in this final rule to terminate the 18-month repetitive inspections for all pumps, regardless whether they are installed in a tank that normally empties, affected by AD 2002-13-10, Amendment 39-12798 (67 FR 45053, July 8, 2002), or AD 2011-11-05, Amendment 39-16704 (76 FR 31462, June 1, 2011), after accomplishment of paragraph (g)(1) of this AD. \n\nRequest To Expand or Remove Automatic Shutoff Limits \n\n\n\tParagraph (g)(2) of the NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) would require additional design features that will automatically shut off a dry-running pump in an empty tank within 60 seconds if the flight crew does not shut it off. FedEx and UPS stated that their Model MD-11 and MD-10 airplanes already have design features installed by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) that shut off the affected pumps automatically, but will not meet the prescribed 60-second time limit. The commenters asserted that a system design change is not necessary. \n\tWe agree. Model MD-11 and MD-10 airplanes with two-person flight crews already have OEM-installed equipment designed to shut off the fuel pumps automatically. We agree that the automatic shut-off time for two-person flight-crew airplanes, which have design features that were originally installed by the airplane manufacturer, may exceed 60 seconds. But for airplanes with three-person flight crews, such as Model DC-10 airplanes that do not have OEM-installed equipment, any fuel pump running in an empty tank must be manually shut off by a flight crew within 60 seconds. In either case, regardless of the number of flight crew, all airplanes must be in compliance with the requirements of paragraph (g)(4) of this AD. \n\nRequest To Require Airworthiness Limitations \n\n\n\tBoeing commented that the proposed rule does not mandate any airworthiness limitations instructions (ALIs) or critical design configuration control limitations (CDCCLs) regarding repetitive inspections or functional checks applicable to the proposed changes. Boeing recommended that we add a requirement to ''incorporate and comply with any related Airworthiness Limitations.'' \n\tWe agree to provide clarification. Paragraph (g) in this final rule requires that the design changes be compliant with 14 CFR Section 25.981(a) and (b) at amendment level 25-125. These design changes including any associated ALIs or CDCCLs must be approved by the Manager of the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. \n\nAdditional Changes to NPRM (77 FR 23166, April 18, 2012) \n\n\n\tIn response to requests by Boeing, we have revised paragraphs (g)(2) and (g)(3) in this final rule to clarify the requirements associated with the airplane flight manual supplement (AFMS), and we have revised paragraph (g)(4) in this final rule to clarify that the requirement is limited to airplanes with tanks that normally empty during flight. \n\tWe have revised the description of the required actions in the preamble of this final rule to remove the requirement to ''ensure that a fuel pump's operation is not affected by certain conditions,'' because those requirements will be incorporated by compliance to 14 CFR Section 25.981(a) and (b) at amendment level 25-125. We disagree with the request to define certain conditions because the AD must allow for a broader interpretation for all airplanes affected by this AD. We have not changed the final rule regarding this issue. \n\nConclusion \n\n\n\tWe reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD with the changes described previously. We also determined that these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of the AD. \n\nCosts of Compliance \n\n\n\tWe estimate that this AD affects 341 airplanes of U.S. registry. We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD, based on the costs of similar supplemental type certificate (STC) installations, and considering an average of 10 pumps per airplane: \n\n\n\tEstimated Costs ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \n\tCost per Cost on U.S. \n\tAction Labor cost Parts cost product operators ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Installing design features.......... 152 work-hours x $85 $137,500 $150,420 $51,293,220 \n\tper hour = $12,920. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \n\nAuthority for this Rulemaking \n\n\n\tTitle 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority. \n\tWe are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ''General requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. \n\nRegulatory Findings \n\n\n\tThis AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national \n\n((Page 24040)) \n\ngovernment and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. \n\tFor the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD: \n\t(1) Is not a ''significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866, \n\t(2) Is not a ''significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), \n\t(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and \n\t(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. \n\nList of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 \n\n\n\tAir transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.