Comments Invited
This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety, and we did not provide you with notice and an opportunity to provide your comments prior to it becoming effective. However, we invite you to participate in this rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. We also invite comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impacts that resulted from adopting this AD. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the AD, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain duplicate comments, commenters should send only one copy of written comments, or if comments are filed electronically, commenters should submit them only one time. We will file in the docket all comments that we receive, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this rulemaking duringthe comment period. We will consider all the comments we receive and may conduct additional rulemaking based on those comments.
Discussion
Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) has issued AD No. CF-2011- 19R1, Revision 1, dated December 7, 2011, to correct an unsafe condition for the Bell Model 206L, 206L-1, 206L-3 helicopters, all serial numbers (S/N), and Model 206L-4 helicopters, S/Ns 52001 through 52430, with servo, part number (P/N) 206-076-062-103, installed. TCCA advises that a ``quality escape'' by a supplier occurred, and a number of Bell servos may have a loose nut, shaft, and clevis assembly. According to TCCA, the loose connection is due to improper lock washer installation. TCAA advises that this discrepancy is not traceable or identifiable except by inspection and that a ``disconnect'' of the affected components may lead to loss of control of the helicopter. TCAA states Revision 1 of its AD retains the mandated inspections and corrective action in the original issue of its AD but expands the applicability to include all serial-numbered servos.
FAA's Determination
These helicopter models are manufactured in Canada and are type certificated for operation in the United States under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.29 and the applicable bilateral agreement. Pursuant to the bilateral agreement, TCCA has kept the FAA informed of the situation described above. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all information provided by TCCA and determined the unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of these same type designs.
Related Service Information
Bell has issued Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) No. 206L-11-169, Revision B, dated August 29, 2011 (ASB), which specifies, before next flight, unless previously accomplished, a one-time inspection for loose or misaligned parts of the servos, P/N 206-076-062-103, installed on Bell Model 206L, 206L-1, and 206L-3 helicopters, all S/Ns, and Model 206L-4 helicopters, S/Ns 52001 through 52430. TCCA classified this ASB as mandatory and issued AD No. CF-2011-19R1 to ensure the continued airworthiness of these helicopters.
Differences Between This AD and the TCAA AD
The TCCA AD requires you to return the parts removed from service to the manufacturer. This AD does not.
AD Requirements
This AD requires for each servo, before further flight, retracting the boot
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and determining whether the nut, shaft, or clevis assembly turns independently from each other. If the shaft turns independently this AD requires replacing the servo with an airworthy servo. If the shaft does not turn independently, this AD requires inspecting the servo to determine the tab alignment. If at least one tab is not aligned with and bent flush against a nut flat surface and at least one tab is not aligned with and bent flush against a flat surface of the clevis assembly, this AD requires replacing the servo with an airworthy servo. If any tab of the lock washer is not bent flush against either a flat surface of the nut or clevis assembly, this AD requires bending the tab flush against a flat surface. This AD also requires re-identifying the servo on the identification plate.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD will affect 695 helicopters of U.S. Registry. We estimate that operators may incur the following costs in order to comply with this AD. It will take about .5 work hour to inspect and re-identify a servo at $85 per work hour for a total cost per helicopter of about $43, and a total cost to the U.S. operator fleet of $29,538. Replacing a servo will take about 2 work hours and parts costing $33,000, for a total cost per helicopter of $33,170.
FAA's Justification and Determination of the Effective Date
Providing an opportunity for public comments prior to adopting these AD requirements would delay implementing the safety actions needed to correct this known unsafe condition. Therefore, wefind that the risk to the flying public justifies waiving notice and comment prior to the adoption of this rule because the required corrective actions must be accomplished before further flight.
Since an unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD, we determined that notice an opportunity for public comment before issuing this AD are impracticable and contrary to the public interest and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in ``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed, I certify that this AD:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);
3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska to the extent that it justifies making a regulatory distinction; and
4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared an economic evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.