Comments Invited \n\n\n\tThis AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety, and we did not provide you with notice and an opportunity to provide your comments prior to it becoming effective. However, we invite you to participate in this rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. We also invite comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impacts that resulted from adopting this AD. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the AD, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain duplicate comments, commenters should send only one copy of written comments, or if comments are filed electronically, commenters should submit them only one time. We will file in the docket all comments that we receive, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this rulemaking duringthe comment period. We will consider all the comments we receive and may conduct additional rulemaking based on those comments. \n\nDiscussion \n\n\n\tThis AD is prompted by AD No. 2013-0187, dated August 16, 2013 (AD 2013-0187), issued by EASA, which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, to correct an unsafe condition for Agusta Model AB412 and AB412EP helicopters. EASA advises of a report of a cracked pinion, part number (P/N) 412-040-301-101, installed in the rotor brake quill, P/N 412-040-123-103, on an AB412 helicopter. EASA states that the crack was discovered by a magnetic particle inspection during a scheduled overhaul of the rotor brake quill. EASA further states that an investigation revealed the crack was due to residual stress generated during the manufacturing process, and that this condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to failure of the pinion with detachment of parts inside the transmission that could cause its malfunction orjamming, finally resulting in loss of control of the helicopter. To address this unsafe condition, EASA AD 2013-0187 requires magnetic particle inspecting the rotor brake pinion, and if there is a crack, replacing the rotor brake pinion. \n\nFAA's Determination \n\n\n\tThese helicopters have been approved by the aviation authority of Italy and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with Italy, EASA, its technical representative, has notified us of the unsafe condition described in the EASA AD. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all information provided by EASA and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of these same type designs. \n\nRelated Service Information \n\n\n\tAgusta has issued Bollettino Tecnico No. 412-135, Revision A, dated July 29, 2013, which describes procedures for a one-time magnetic particle inspection of the rotor brake pinion, P/N 412-040- \n\n((Page 35036))301-101, installed on Model AB412 and AB412EP helicopters. \n\nAD Requirements \n\n\n\tThis AD requires, within 100 hours time-in-service, magnetic particle inspecting the rotor brake pinion, P/N 412-040-301-101, for a crack. If there is a crack, this AD requires replacing the pinion before further flight. \n\nDifferences Between This AD and the EASA AD \n\n\n\tThe EASA AD does not apply to pinions installed in a rotor brake quill assembly that has been overhauled, while this AD does. \n\nCosts of Compliance \n\n\n\tThere are no costs of compliance with this AD because there are no helicopters with this type certificate on the U.S. Registry. \n\nFAA's Justification and Determination of the Effective Date \n\n\n\tThere are no helicopters with this type certificate on the U.S. Registry. Therefore, we believe it is unlikely that we will receive any adverse comments or useful information about this AD from U.S. operators. \n\tSince an unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD, we determined that notice and opportunity for public comment before issuing this AD are unnecessary because there are none of these products on the U.S. Registry and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days. \n\nAuthority for This Rulemaking \n\n\n\tTitle 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. ''Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority. \n\tWe are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in ''Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. \n\nRegulatory Findings \n\n\n\tWe determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. \n\tFor the reasons discussed, I certify that this AD: \n\t1. Is not a ''significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866; \n\t2. Is not a ''significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); \n\t3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska to the extent that it justifies making a regulatory distinction; and \n\t4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. \n\nList of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 \n\n\n\tAir transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.